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Objectives of Presentation

As countries attain democracy, their territorial borders and internal
productivity systems open up to the functionalities of globalization,
characterized by, among other things, trade and investment activities across
national frontiers. In Kenya, improvements in democratic governance have
attracted a wide array of land-based activities by both local private investors
and those from virtually every country in the world, meaning that the
country is now a viable destination for private investment. So significant is
private investment to the country’s development that its government has
established a distinct institution, dubbed KenInvest, tasked with the
responsibility of attracting private investments from around the world.1
The need for development activities to spur the country’s economic
growth has created many investment opportunities that are deemed
attractive by foreign and local investors. The result is that there are
currently a large number of foreign and local investors undertaking a variety
of land-based investment activities.
Such projects include the
establishment of tourist hotels by British, Italian, German, and investors of
* University of Nairobi, School of Law and National Environment Tribunal;
Nairobi, Kenya.
1. KenIvest, INVESTINKENYA.COM,
invest (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).

http://www.investmentkenya.com/about-ken
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other nationalities (especially along the coast of Kenya);2 large-scale
cultivation of cash crops, including fruits by Del Monte;3 and biofuel crops
by foreign investment companies.4 Among others, Chinese investors are
constructing roads and residential apartments,5 and a British investor’s
mobile telephone baking service is now deemed to be one of the most
lucrative investments worldwide, generating billions of shillings in revenue
every month.6 Investments in all the aforementioned areas require
possession of a valid interest in land, whether freehold or leasehold.7 Even
operation of telephone banking services requires access to land, given that
construction of telephone masts requires acquisition of a valid interest in
land.
On the backdrop of the prevailing position summarized above, this
paper seeks to increase actual and potential investor knowledge about (i)
the existing government’s restrictive regulations of private land use, and (ii)
emerging developments in the nature of land ownership and related claims

2. For example, in Watamu Marine Stakeholders Ass’n & Another v. Nat’l Env’t
Auth. & Blazer Watamu Ltd. (2007) N.E.T. 07 (Kenya), Blazer Watamu Ltd., a company
owned by Italians was in the process of constructing villas on a peninsula at the
coast of Kenya. The Authority stopped the activity because of the ecological
sensitivity of the peninsular.
3. See, DELMONTE KENYA LTD., Company Profile, http://www.manta.com (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013).
4. Such companies include Bedford Biofuels Ltd., which, in Nature Kenya v.
Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. (NEMA) and Bedford Biofuels Ltd., (2011) N.E.T. 79 (Kenya),
sought to defend its decision to cultivate jatropha caucus on more than 219,000 acres
of land in Tana Delta, Kenya.
5. See, for example, China Signs Contract to Boost Kenya’s Road Network, STANDARD
DIGITAL (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000026600&
story_title=China-signs-contract-to-boost-Kenya%E2%80%99s-road-network, which
confirms that Chinese companies are undertaking road construction on most of
Kenya’s highways and that China Roads and Bridges Corporation, one of the
companies involved in the works, has been in Kenya for over twenty six years. It is a
fact that increasingly, the companies are also engaging in housing constructions
works.
6. The Company is known as
safaricom.co.ke (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).

Safaricom.

See,

SAFARICOM,

www.

7. All investments involving land-based activities require ownership of an
interest in land and for that purpose, KenInvest is tasked with, among other things,
“facilitation and management of investment sites, estates or land together with
associated facilities on the sites, estates and land” (§ 15(2)(d)). The Ministry of
Lands is one of the ministries represented in the Kenya Investment Authority (§
16(2)(d) of the Investment Promotion Act, No. 6 of 2004).
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against government regulation of private land use activities that might
impact investment activities. This paper is also intended to inform readers
of the emergence of regulatory takings claims in Kenya, lessons learnt from
previous regulatory takings conferences, and the potential influence of
United States regulatory takings jurisprudence on the determination of
similar cases in Kenya.

II.

Background Information

In traditional societies, there were informal rules and regulations
governing acquisition, ownership, and use of land. However, there was no
formal system of land law in Kenya until 1899, four years after the British
administration declared Kenya a British Protectorate.8 When the British
colonial administration was extended to Kenya, application of the Indian
Lands Acquisition Act of 1894 was applied to provide a basis for settler
acquisition, ownership, and use of land. The significance of that piece of
legislation is that it marked the process of systematic introduction into
Kenya of a common law system of land tenure, with all the attendant
principles, doctrines, and concepts of ownership, use, and alienation. The
progressive establishment of a common law system of land ownership in
Kenya saw the introduction of a number of laws in the form of ordinances,
particularly, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, which conferred ownership
of all land in the region now Kenya on her Majesty, the Queen of England,
and introduced a system of land grants by her Majesty (through her
assignsgovernors and commissioners in Kenya) to individuals and
companies in the form of leaseholds for a term of years and freeholds
(ownership in fee simple).9
The progressive introduction of an English system of land law in Kenya
did not occur in isolationit was complemented by a number of English
administrative laws, including the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act of 1939.10 The act established official limitations to land
ownership and use rights, largely through the exercise of (i) the
governmental power of eminent domain and (ii) police powers.11 The

8. The process of establishment of a formal system of land law in Kenya
commenced with adoption of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and subsequently,
passage of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902.
9.
10.

Crown Lands Ordinance (1902) (Kenya).
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (1939) (Kenya).

11. The power of Eminent Domain is the power of the state or its assigns to
acquire private property for public purposes, subject to the prompt payment of
compensation. Whenever the state exercises this power, it forces involuntary
transfers of property from private owners to itself or its assigns. The power of
eminent domain is derived from the feudal notion that as the sovereign, the state
447
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exercise of both powers were retained after independence, as reflected in the
country’s former and current constitution and a number of statutes
governing land and related matters including the Land Acquisition Act (now
repealed),12 the Agriculture Act,13 and more recently, the Environmental
Management and Co-ordination Act of 199914 and the Land Act of 2012.15

III.

Recognition of Physical Taking in Kenya

Through the exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain,
the law of physical takings of private property has been recognized and
officially legitimized in Kenya since colonial days.16 Eminent domain is the
power of the State or its assigns to acquire private property for public
purposes, subject to the prompt payment of compensation.17 In Kanini Farm
Ltd. v. Comm’r of Lands (Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1981), for example, the court
asserted that in case of derogation of the right to property through
compulsory acquisition, prompt and just compensation must be paid.18
Whenever the State exercises this power, it forces involuntary transfers of
property from private owners to itself or its assigns. The power of eminent
domain is derived from the feudal notion that as the sovereign, the state
holds the radical title to all land within its territory. In Kenya, this power
was embodied in the former constitution, which mandated that private
property could only be acquired compulsorily for public use.19 Further, the
constitution required that such public use must be weighed against the

holds the radical title to all land within its territory. Police power is the power of the
state to regulate land use in the public interest in order to secure proper resource
utilization and management. Exercise of the power is also an attribute of the
sovereignty of a state.
12. The Land Acquisition Act (1894) (India), whose application was extended
to Kenya in 1899.
13.

The Agric. Act, (1980) (Kenya).

14.

The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, No. 8 (1999) (Kenya).

15.

The Land Act, No. 6 (2012) (Kenya).

16. See expressions of the power in section 75 of the former national
constitution, which authorized compulsory acquisition of private property, for public
purposes.
The power of compulsory acquisition of private property was
subsequently expressed in article 40(3) of the current national Constitution and in
sections 107 to 127 of the Land Act, No. 6 (2012).
17.

CONSTITUTION, art. 40(3) (2010) (Kenya), and Land Act, No. 6 (2012) §§ 107-127.

18. Kanini Farm Ltd. v. Comm’r of Lands (1981) 1 K.L.R. 120, 120-26 (E&L)
(H.C.K) (Kenya).
19.
448
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hardship that may be caused to the landowner.20 Finally, the constitution
required that the acquisition be accompanied by prompt payment of
adequate compensation.21 The former constitution also provided for a
modified form of acquisition in the case of trust land (referred to as “setting
apart”), which may be activated by the President or local authorities.22 The
rules governing the setting apart of trust land and the payment of
compensation to affected residents are contained in the Trust Land Act.23
The substantive law and basic tenets of compulsory land acquisition
were incorporated in the new Constitution of Kenya that was approved by
national referendum in 2010.24 The right to own land is enshrined in article
40, which guarantees “every person” the right to own property of any
description in Kenya.25 It prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property,26 but
permits compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes upon payment
of prompt and adequate compensation.27 The new Land Act of 2012, in
sections 108 through 121, reiterates the principle that land shall be
compulsorily acquired for public purposes only upon payment of prompt
and adequate compensation.28 For the first time, section 121 uses the term
“taking” with reference to physical taking of land compulsorily acquired.29
One of the concepts newly introduced with regard to physical taking of land
is a grant of alternative land (in lieu of payment of compensation)30 and
payment of additional compensation, where it emerges that the value of
land compulsorily acquired was much higher.31
Courts in Kenya have had occasion to address various claims as a
result of compulsory acquisition, arising mainly from failure to pay
compensation at all,32 delay in payment of compensation,33 payment of

20.

CONSTITUTION, § 75(b) (1987) (Kenya).

21.

CONSTITUTION, § 75 (c) (1987) (Kenya).

22.

CONSTITUTION, §117 (1987) (Kenya).

23.

Trust Land Act, (2009) Chapter 288 (Kenya).

24.

CONSTITUTION, art. 3 (2010) (Kenya).

25.

CONSTITUTION, art. 40(1) (2010) (Kenya).

26.

CONSTITUTION, art. 40(2) (2010) (Kenya).

27.

CONSTITUTION, art. 40(3)(b)(i) (2010) (Kenya).

28.

The Land Act, (2012) §§ 108 and 121 (Kenya).

29.

The Land Act, (2012) §121 (Kenya).

30.

The Land Act, (2012) §117 (Kenya).

31.

The Land Act, (2012) §120 (Kenya).

32. See, for example, Shayona Timber Ltd. v. Kenya Nat’l Highway Auth. (2012)
H.C.K (Nakuru), Civil Suit No. 149 (Kenya). Kenya National Highway Authority
purportedly acquired land reference number 9950/8 (original No. L.R. No. 9950/1/3,
East of Nakuru Municipality) for road expansion without compensation.
449
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inadequate compensation,34 and payment of compensation where
landowners are removed from acquired land before finding alternative
settlement sites.35 However, the law on physical taking of property by
government and its agencies for public purposes has been in Kenya for a
long time and is, generally, deemed to be acceptable; save for issues that
arise concerning procedure, which are now governed by additional
provisions in the new Land Act of 2012.

IV.

The Exercise of Police Powers and Emergence of
Regulatory Takings Claims

In addition to explicit authorization of physical taking of private
property for public purposes, a number of laws in Kenya governing various
matters concerning land permit the government to limit or restrict private
use of land, without physically taking away land, for a variety of purposes
and reasons. Such justifications include the need for proper land use
planning,36 prevention of environmental harm,37 and insurance of
sustainable utilization of land and related resources.38 The exercise of police
power is also an attribute of the sovereignty of the state. In relation to
restriction of property use, the exercise of this power was expressed in
section 70(c) of the former constitution. That section specified that the
rights set out in sections 70(a) and (b) of the same constitution with regard
to property rights, including land-related rights, were guaranteed subject to
such limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of those rights and
freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of
others or the public interest.39 In the current constitution, the power is
expressed more explicitly with reference to government control of land use
activities as follows: “The State may regulate the use of any land, or any

33.

Id.

34. The issue was considered, among others, in Nzioka & 2 Others v. Tiomin
Kenya Ltd., (2001) 97 K.L.R. 427 (Mombasa High Court) (Kenya),
35. Id. Local inhabitants complained that the Respondent mining company
promised to relocate them to alternative place before taking over the land but
reneged on the promise.
36. Need for proper land use planning is specifically expressed in article 66(1)
of the Constitution (2010). It is also reflected in article 60 of the same Constitution
and in the Preamble to the Physical Planning Act (1986) (Kenya), among other
provisions of law.
37. CONSTITUTION, art. 42 and 69(1)(g) (2010) (Kenya), and The Envtl. Mgmt. and
Co-ordination Act (1999) §§ 42-56, §§ 58-62, §§108-116, §142 (inter alia).
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CONSTITUTION, art. 60(1) and 66(1).

39.

CONSTITUTION, §70(c) (1969) (Kenya).

West

Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013

interest in or right over any land, in the interest of defence, public safety,
public order, public morality, public health or land use planning.”40
An analysis of the laws indicates that so wide are some of the
government’s land use control powers that their exercise could, in effect,
render one’s private land less economically beneficial, or simply make it
impossible for one to utilize his land at all. An overview of such provisions
follows:

A. Imposition of Land Preservation Measures
Existing provisions in older legislation with far-reaching control effects
that could make it impossible for one to utilize land at all, or prohibit the
only economically viable use of land include provisions of sections 48(1)(a)
through (e) of the Agriculture Act.41 The Act authorizes the minister
responsible for matters concerning agriculture to require landowners to
implement land preservation measures.42 In enforcing such preservation
measures, the minister could issue orders prohibiting or controlling clearing
or breaking land for cultivation, prohibit grazing or watering livestock on a
particular parcel, and prohibit or control burning or destruction of
vegetation.43 The minister can also issue land preservation orders requiring
landowners, instead of cultivating desired crops, to undertake afforestation
and reafforestation on their land and destroy or uproot any vegetation
planted on their land in contravention of land preservation orders without
compensation.44 Orders may also be issued to prohibit the use of one’s land
for agricultural purposes altogether.45 Failure to comply with the orders
attracts undesirable penalties.46 It is noted that government orders
requiring the specified actions would have the effect of making it impossible
for landowners to fully undertake desired beneficial activities on their land
or to use their land at all, and could amount to regulatory takings. However,
it is also noted that the foregoing provisions of the Agriculture Act are rarely
implemented.

40.

CONSTITUTION, art. 66(1) (2010) (Kenya).

41.

The Agric. Act, (1980) § 48 (1)(a)-(e) (Kenya).

42.

The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318,§43 (Kenya).

43.

The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §48 (1)(a)-(e) (Kenya).

44.

The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §48 (1)(b) & (c)-62 (Kenya).

45.

The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §48(1)(b)-(e) (Kenya).

46.

The Agric. Act, (1980) Cap. 318 §60 (Kenya).
451
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B. Declaration of Environmentally Significant Areas
Provisions in more recent legislation include section 54 of the
Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA), which
empowers the responsible minister to declare areas of land to be
environmentally-significant areas for purposes of protection.47 On the basis
of statutory authority, the minister may declare “any” area of land to be an
environmentally significant area for purposes of promoting and preserving
specific ecological processes, natural environmental systems, natural
beauty, species of indigenous wildlife, or the preservation of biodiversity in
general.48 Thereupon, the National Environment Management Authority
(NEMA) would prescribe measures for management and protection of an
area so declared.49 However, there is no provision for payment of
compensation to an owner whose land is declared environmentally
significant.50 Nor does such a declaration constitute compulsory acquisition
for which provisions for compensation would apply.
Although no area of land in Kenya has been so declared, there are
many qualifying areas in the country, including cheetah breeding grounds,
swamps, water catchment areas, and private lands that serve as habitat for
wildlife. Both individual conservationists and conservation organizations
have been urging the responsible ministers to issue declaratory orders to
preserve deserving ecologically-significant areas as authorized by law.51
Under the circumstances, it may be just a matter of time before an area is so
declared, giving rise to claims for compensation resulting from regulatory
action. It is noted that provisions for declaration of environmentally
significant areas affirm, in most minds, the government’s prioritization of
environmental conservation measures that, together with other regulatory
provisions of law, encourage citizens and other concerned parties to take
enforcement actions including preparation of environmental impact
assessments (EIA).

C. Imposition of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Requirements
So far, enforcement of EIA provisions of EMCA has generated the
clearest indication of landowner preparedness to present to the government
a regulatory takings claim. EIA requirements in sections 58-64 of EMCA and

47.

The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §54(1) (Kenya).

48.

Id.

49.

The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §54(2) (Kenya).

50.

Id.

51. The statutory provisions authorizing declaration of environmentally
significant areas on “any land” do not provide for compensation of landowners.
452
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the EIA and Audit Regulations (issued by Legal Notice No. 191 of 2003)
present the most commonly used government mechanism for restricting
private land use, with far-reaching consequences.52 The basic idea behind
an EIA is that the government should predetermine the impacts that a
development might have on the surrounding environment, and on that
basis, make a prior determination to prohibit it, allow it conditionally, or
allow it unconditionally.53 The Second Schedule to EMCA lists the kinds of
activities requiring an EIA.54 Additionally, any activity that is out of character
with its surroundings requires an EIA.55
EIA and audit regulations specify the procedure to be followed by
developers, also known as project proponents, in conducting EIAs prior to
approval and license of a development. The process involves preparation of
a project report describing the nature of the development to be undertaken,
the proposed location, materials to be used, the environment of the locality
(baseline information on the environment of the locality), likely negative
impacts, and a plan for mitigating negative environmental impacts.56 If the
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), to which a developer
submits a project report, determines from the report that a development is
likely to have significant impacts on the environment or that a developer’s
proposed mitigation measures will not adequately address likely negative
impacts, NEMA shall require a developer to undertake a full EIA study, to be
conducted on behalf of a developer by an EIA expert.57 At the end of the
whole process, including public participation, NEMA may decide to reject
the project (meaning that it cannot be undertaken at all), approve the
project with conditions intended to safeguard the environment, or approve
the development unconditionally.58
Through the EIA process briefly discussed, the government has,
through NEMA, restricted private land uses of many kinds in the interest of
environmental conservation, including conservation of biological diversity.
For example, the government has, through NEMA (hereinafter, the
Authority), restricted a private landowner to developing a maximum of four

52.

The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §58-64 (Kenya).

53.

The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §63 (Kenya).

54.

The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) (Kenya).

55. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) (Kenya), Second Schedule,
Projects to Undergo Environmental Impact Assessment.
56. EIA and Audit Regulations, Regulations 7(g) and (h) of the EIA and Audit
Regulations, Legal Notice No. 101 (2003) (Kenya).
57. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §59 (Kenya), and Regulation
7(3) of the EIA and Audit Regulations, Legal Notice No. 101 (2003) (Kenya).
58. The Envtl. Mgmt. & Co-ordination Act, (1999) §60 (Kenya) and §§ 10 & 23
of the EIA and Audit Regulations, Legal Notice No. 101 (2003) (Kenya).
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floors, down from the eight floors that the landowner was in the process of
building, to house twenty one units on its private land known as Plot No.
209/4902 in Riverside Gardens on Riverside Drive in Nairobi.59 The
government has also, through the Authority, restricted a landowner’s
development by requiring it to observe a six-meter riparian reserve of River
Kirichwa Kubwa, which, in effect, forced the landowner to demolish a stone
wall he had erected around his property.60 Additionally, the government has
stopped a private landowner from converting the use of his land in a
residential neighborhood to a commercial center on the basis that such use
would negatively impact the aesthetic character of the surrounding
environment and cause noise pollution and vehicular traffic without a
showing by the developer of sufficient mitigation.61

V.

Emergence of Takings Claims

The foregoing cases, among others in which private land use was
partially restricted, did not generate any kind of claim for compensation,
though property owners did assert their property use rights. However, when
the government, through the National Environment Tribunal, stopped a
developer from constructing two luxury villas at the coast, it prohibited an
investor from undertaking the desired development at all, and a claim of a
regulatory takings nature emerged.62 The appeal was filed by an
environmental conservation organization against the Authority’s approval
and license of the establishment by an Italian developer of seven luxury
villas on the basis that the process of approval was flawed, the
developer/investor had encroached onto a public beach access, the land
subsequently transferred to the developer had been illegally acquired, and
that stakeholders were not properly involved in the Authority’s process of
approval of the development.63
In reply to the appeal, the investor raised the constitutionally
guaranteed property right to utilize the land, which it stated was being
infringed by parties seeking to stop the development.64 Before the Tribunal
concluded hearing the appeal, the investor filed a judicial review application

59. Phenom Ltd. v. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. & Riverside Gardens Residents’
Ass’n (2005) 1, 4 N.E.T. 6 (Kenya).
60. A.T. Kaminchia v. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth. & M/S Bell Ways Garden Ltd.,
(2005) 1-13 N.E.T. 5 (Kenya).
61. New Muthaiga Residents’ Ass’n v. The Director General, Nat’l Env’t Mgmt.
Auth. & Gemini Properties Ltd,, (2007) 24 N.E.T. 27.
62. Malindi Green Town Movement & Another v. NEMA, Silversand Camping
Site Ltd. & Another (2005) 6 N.E.T. 3-12 (2nd Respondent’s evidence) (Kenya).
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in the High Court, claiming that by challenging its right to own and develop
the property in question, both the Tribunal and the appellants had infringed
its rights to own and use property.65 The investor emphasized that the rights
were derived from section 75 of the former constitution, which had elaborate
provisions for protection of the right, now to some extent incorporated in
Article 40 of the current constitution. The investor sought orders of
prohibition to stop the Tribunal from continuing to infringe the right by
stopping it from proceeding with hearing. The High Court granted the order
of prohibition on the ground that the appellants did not have locus standi to
prefer the appeal, in the process directing the investor to present its
property rights claims to the Constitutional Court.66 The Tribunal appealed
the decision, based on legal expansion of locus standi, especially under
section 3 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, EMCA
of 1999 (it is noted that the new national constitution has further expanded
locus standi on environment and human rights matters).67 The Tribunal’s
appeal is still pending in the High Court.68
One of the points of concern for the Tribunal in Malindi Green Town
Movement was that an aggrieved party, a developer, had responded to the
application of regulatory restrictions with a property rights claim, based on
constitutional provisions. Would that be the end of such claims?
Unfortunately, in judicial review, the High Court could not address the
property rights matter, nor will it be addressed on appeal because the
Tribunal only appealed the issue of locus standi. It soon emerged that similar
claims would begin to appear as investors sought to avoid regulatory
limitation of their land use activities.69
A year later, through an appeal, the Tribunal stopped a leaseholder
from constructing a tourist lodge and camp in a cheetah breeding ground in
an area slightly outside Maasai Mara Game Reserve in an effort to preserve
the cheetah breeding ground.70 In that case, the landowner, who had leased
land to a foreign investor, asserted his absolute land ownership rights and

65. Republic v. NET, NEMA, Malindi Green Town Movement & Malindi South
Residents Ass’n. (2006) H.C.K , Misc, Application No. 391.
66.

Id.

67. CONSTITUTION, art. 70(1) & (3) (2010), echoing § 3 of the Envtl. Mgmt. & Coordination Act (1999) (Kenya).
68. Republic v. NET, NEMA and Malindi Green Town Movement & Malindi
South Residents Ass’n, supra note 67.
69. See, Mutaka Ole Mpoya v. Maasai Mara North Conservancy Ltd. & Kenya
Tourism Fed’n (Nakuru Constitutional Reference No. 66 of 2010 /JR 34/2010) in which
a similar claim has been raised in Malindi Green Town Movement.
70. Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n v. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth.,
Wasafiri Camp Ltd. & Ben Kipeno & Others (2006) 07 N.E.T.
455
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raised the issue of compensation of a regulatory takings nature.71 Ben
Kipeno owns freehold land about two miles from the boundary of Maasai
Mara Game Reserve, which he argued, he could not utilize for subsistence
and commercial farming because of the presence of wildlife in the area.72 In
order to generate money from the land, his only source of income, he invited
a foreign investor to lease the land, at a fee, to establish tourist facilities
thereon.73 The investor prepared an EA project report and submitted it as
part of his application to the Authority for an EIA license.74 The investor’s
application was granted and the development approved at a project report
stagethe fact that the land in question was a breeding ground having been
overlooked, concealed, or ignored.
After the investor commenced
construction work, the Narok County Council, the local authority in whose
jurisdiction the development in question was being undertaken, and the
Kenya Tourism Federation, a conglomerate of a number of private agencies
with various tourism related activities, appealed the Authority’s decision to
approve and license the development at the project report stage.75 The
County Council and the Tourism Federation contended that the EIA study
process that informed the Authority’s decision to approve the development
was flawed, having significant issues such as the fact that the area in
question was a cheetah breeding ground was overlooked (and yet cheetahs
are an endangered species in Kenya), and that key stakeholders were not
involved in the development’s approval process.76
The landowner’s takings claims were raised in evidence during hearing
of the appeal. The landowner claimed, inter alia, that he could not undertake
any other activity on the land than team with an investor to establish a
tourist facility because of the presence of wildlife in the area.77 He stated
that for subsistence, he could have been farming, but could not do so due to
the wildlife.78 He asserted that he had a constitutional right to use his
property to earn a living and that stopping him from utilizing his land for the
only commercially viable purpose was equivalent to taking his land away

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73. The information was presented as part of Ben Kipeno’s evidence in Narok
Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n, supra note 71.
74. See, 2nd Respondent’s evidence in Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n,
supra note 71.
75.

Kenya Tourism Fed’n v. NEMA & Ol Keju Ronkai Limited (2008) N.E.T 30.

76.

Id.

77. See, 2nd Respondent’s evidence in Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism
Fed’n v. Nat’l Env’t Mgmt. Auth., Wasafiri Camp Ltd. & Ben Kipeno & Others (2006)
N.E.T 7.
78.
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from him.79 He argued that if the government stopped him from utilizing the
land, it would have to pay him compensation for prohibiting him from
making use of the land.80 The landowner and his witnesses stated that if
they were stopped from using the land without compensation, they would
make it impossible for wildlife to exist on the land.81 The Tribunal ordered
that a full EIA study be conducted for the project, and in the meantime
stopped the development.82
For the fist time, the Tribunal was presented with a takings claim of
this kind, which prompted members to seek more information on land use
related claims where they could find it, and hence their attendance of the
Regulatory Takings Conference for the first time. One of the lessons learned
was that the legal system in the United States recognizes land holder claims
based on government restrictions and regulations that substantially
diminish commercial viability of land, and that there are established legal
parameters within which such claims may be honored.83
Further property rights claims were raised in response to appeals filed
against private developments in the following cases:
Kenya Tourism Federation v. NEMA & Ol Keju Ronkai Limited (NET/30/08): In
a developer’s response to an appeal against the establishment of a tourist
facility on the outskirts of Maasai Mara on the basis that the attempt to
restrict the development infringed property ownership rights. The Tribunal’s
ruling on a preliminary objection, allowing the appeal to proceed, was
appealed to the High Court and is still pending.84
Maasai Mara North Conservancy v. NEMA & Wasafiri Camp Limited
(NET/40/2009) and the related Constitutional Petition No. 68 of 2010- Kerio
Ole Naimodu v. Maasai Mara North Conservancy Ltd. & Kenya Tourism Federation: In
the appeal before the Tribunal in NET/40/2009, appellants challenged the
Authority’s failure to enforce the Tribunal’s judgment in NET/06/2005 by
preventing the developers from proceeding with establishment of a tourist

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81. See, 2nd Respondent’s evidence in Narok Cnty. Council & Kenya Tourism Fed’n,
supra note 78.
82.

Id.

83. See, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314
(1987), First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 314 (1987) and Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida DEP, 130 S. Ct.
2592 (2010) in which courts in the United States expressed willingness to recognize
certain government actions and decisions as constituting compensable regulatory
takings.
84.

Kenya Tourism Fed’n, supra note 78.
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facility on a cheetah breeding ground. By the time of filing the appeal, land
initially meant for the development had been merged with others, including
a lot belonging to Kerio Ole Naimodu, the petitioner in the Constitutional
Court, and leased to an investor as a partner with the landowners in Leopard
Gorge Conservancy, for the establishment of a tourist facility.
Before the appeal was heard, Ole Naimodu, one of the land owners,
filed a constitutional petition in the High Court in which he elaborately
asserted his rights under sections 74-81 of the former constitution and
sections 27 and 28 of the Registered Land Act (now repealed and replaced,
in part, by the Land Act of 2012). Naimodu’s petition argued that: (1) he had
both constitutional and statutory rights of absolute ownership over his land;
(2) the rights were constitutionally guaranteed and protected; (3) he had the
right to protection from deprivation of property without compensation; (4)
that he had a legal guarantee to utilize his land for subsistence and
commercial activities; (5) that he had the right under section 76 of the
constitution not to be held in slavery or servitude in relation to the use of
his property; (6) that he had the right not to accept entry by others into his
land except by his consent under section 76 of the constitution; (7) that
leopards that strayed on his property should be moved to Maasai Mara
Game Reserve in respect of his property rights; (8) that section 80 of the
constitution guaranteed him the right not to be hindered in the enjoyment
of his freedom to associate with others for protection of his property
interests; and (9) that on the basis of his Title Deed, he had the right to live
on the land and undertake any agricultural or other development activity
thereon. He also claimed that by presenting an appeal to the Tribunal
against the grant to his lessee of development approval and license by the
Authority, the Appellants were depriving him of his property and
contravening his constitutional right to enjoy the property. In addition, he
claimed that by stating that the Leopard Gorge area constituted by part of
his land was a cheetah breeding ground that should not be interfered with,
Appellants elevated the rights of animals above his constitutionally
protected property rights.85
The claim by the petitioner that presenting an appeal to the Tribunal
against the grant to his lessee of development approval and license by the
Authority and his joint use of the land amounted to deprivation of his
property is the aspect that comes close to claiming that application of EIA
regulations deprive him of use of his property. However, the petitioner did
not ask the Constitutional Court for compensation. He sought to stay
proceedings in the Tribunal and obtain an order restraining appellants in
the Tribunal appeal from filing further cases against his use of the property.

85. Maasai Mara North Conservancy v. NEMA & Wasafiri Camp Ltd. (2009)
40.

N.E.T.
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The Constitutional Petition has not yet been heard, but the Court has issued
an order staying proceedings in the Tribunal.86
Analysis of regulatory takings, like the claims in this paper, is limited
to appeals, petitions, and judicial review applications that originated from
the Tribunal. It does not include an analysis of other claims that may have
been presented to the High Court, outside of the Tribunal’s appeal
processes. Therefore, it may not be concluded that takings litigation is at
the stage at which it has manifested in matters revolving around the
Tribunal’s functions. What does appear clear, from the claims described in
the foregoing paragraphs, is that they manifest assertions of property rights
that go beyond and seem to be intended by claimants to override the
exercise of police powers of the state. It also appears that as people
become more enlightened, landowners are likely to advance their claims
beyond the assertion of constitutional right to use property, to outright
claims for compensation for land-based activities rendered impossible or
limited by the application of official regulations, including EIA provisions,
especially in light of the newly introduced provisions of the current
constitution regarding property ownership and use.
Although the constitution provides in Article 66(1) that the State may
regulate the use of any land, or any interest in or right over any land, in the
interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public
health, or land use planning;87 some of its provisions seem to lend credence
to claims for compensation in cases of “regulatory taking.” Provisions of
concern include: (1) Article 40(2)(a), which provides that “Parliament shall
not enact a law that permits the State or any person: (a) to arbitrarily
deprive a person of property of any description or of any interest in, or right
over, any property of any description; (b) to limit, or in any way restrict the
enjoyment of any right under this Article on the basis of any of the grounds
specified or contemplated in Article 27(4);”88 and (2) Article 40(3), which
specifies that:
The State shall not deprive a person of any property of any
description, or of any interest in, or right over, property of any
description, unless the deprivation: (a) results from an
acquisition of land or an interest in land or a conversion of an
interest in land, or title to land, in accordance with Chapter Five
(which includes Article 66(1) aforementioned, but negates

86.

Id.

87.

CONSTITUTION, art. 66(1) (2010) (Kenya).

88. CONSTITUTION, art. 40(2)(a) (2010) (Kenya). “Any interest in any property of
any description” above could be understood to extend to development interests that
one could now argue to be beyond government’s limitation, unless it is deemed that
there is an internal conflict between the above provisions and article 66(1).
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regulation for specified purposes unless land is first acquired); or
(b) is for a public purpose or in the public interest and is carried
out in accordance with this Constitution and any Act of
Parliament that (i) requires prompt payment, in full, of just
compensation to the person; and (ii) allows any person who has
an interest in, or right over, that property a right of access to a
court of law.89

VI.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Claims already presented are indicative of the likelihood of
presentation of more specific claims for compensation arising from
application of government regulations, especially environmental regulations
in the Tribunal and in the recently established Land and Environment Court.
If arguments such as those described above are advanced a little further and
with some knowledge of the relevant body of persuasive jurisprudence in
other common law countries, the government could be faced with a number
of costly regulatory takings claims. Therefore, further training on the
applicability of government regulations as they relate to property ownership
and use is necessary. A clarification of the full import of the constitutional
provisions, especially articles 40(2) and (3) is also necessary. It is expected
that actual and would-be investors would benefit from knowledge that there
are government restrictions that might impact their investment activities,
positively or negatively.

89.
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CONSTITUTION, art. 40(3) (2010) (Kenya).

